S. A. Shelley: After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the global trade order allowed for unprecedented bounties of consumer goods to flow to more and more people while lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. But it also allowed the political class of the West to become self-deceived and inured to the continued dangers to our way of life. I’m not a Marxist, but I will definitely agree that society has been a constant struggle for power across all spectrums since antiquity. Consequently, in the west we built institutions around law, order and good governance to assuage that struggle, while in the East they went the authoritarian route to hammer that struggle into remission. But while Western politicians splurged on largesse for the masses, the more authoritarian ones did not forget to splurge on defense. We did and we will pay dearly for it shortly.
The American automotive industry produces a little over 10 million automobiles a year, most of which are pick-ups and SUV types. At an average of 1.75 tonnes for such vehicles, that means that US industry is capable of milling and machining about 17.5 million tonnes of steel a year to move people in a pleasant manner. The average weight of a 155 mm artillery shell used by the American military weighs in at about 45 kg. US industry is struggling to produce 1 million such shells a year: About 45,000 tonnes of steel is milled and machined into these critical defense components. Comparing the ratio of car production to artillery shell production is about roughly 390 to 1. A classic economics issue of cars vs cannons (guns vs butter). Think about this, America can produce 390 cars for every 1 artillery shell needed to keep America safe.
A little dictatorship such as North Korea can produce 3 million artillery shells a year just to export to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China can produce even more.
Therein lies the problem. War, unfortunately, is a mass consumer of material (people, things and energy). It is completely understandable that in America we like clean wars with low casualties. However, when the American technical superiority gap over enemies disappears, our enemies are still prepared for high material wars where mass and numbers count. We are not.
Which brings me to the US Navy. The US Navy cannot supply enough missiles or ammunition for the ships that it has and at the volume that will be needed in any imminent major conflict. The US Navy is in dire need of a rebuild. As acknowledged by analysts in the pentagon and out, China can outbuild America by multiples. It takes China 3 years to build an aircraft carrier, while America can do it in 10 years. Until recently, it used to be said that America’s navy exceeded (in numbers) the next 10 navies in the world. No more – it’s China that will soon take on that distinction. It’s also said that China does not have a big deepwater navy that can project firepower far from shore. The panic in Australia and New Zealand over the PLA-N’s (People’s Liberation Army – Navy) recent live fire exercises proves that assertion wrong. It’s also been said that the majority of China’s naval vessels can’t sail more than 1000 nautical miles from the Chinese coastline. To which I would reply, that’s well within range of the “First Island Chain“.
So, what is America going to do about it? Dither more, overspend and underdeliver is my guess. Though there are some conversations now about increasing naval vessel construction, the likelihood of that happening quickly enough to make a difference is very low. So another thought now making the rounds is to add armaments to American merchant vessels in times of crisis. Technologically, I like some of the ideas being bantered about. Regrettably if we can do this, so too can our likely enemies, and they have way bigger merchant fleets than we do.
In the age of empires, merchant vessels were armed and in times of war pressed into service. Up until the early 18th century, privateering was an established practice whereby monarchs would send letters of marque to private vessels to engage in piracy, raiding and such in the name of the Crown. Ships of the line were few but devastatingly effective when needed, while the lighter merchant vessels, especially in the Dutch and British navies, proved quite good at harassing enemy commerce and trade, but were too often useless against ships of the line.
Over the centuries, navies advanced as industrial output advanced. Naval ships became steel monstrosities, capable of hurling destruction over the horizon. Fleets grew until, by the two world wars, fleet actions, engagements by multiple ships at the same time, were common. But now it seems that if we can’t compete on industry, can’t trade some cars for more ammo and ships, then we will choose a politically expedient path of reverting back to historical solutions. Is this all we can afford or is this really a viable solution? What prince* can rely upon the services of mercenaries for the protection of the state?
Vive l’Alberta libre!
* Yes, that’s a paraphrase from Machiavelli**.
** Yes, contrary to popular misconception and personal experience, this naval architect is reasonably well read.
